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STATEMENT OF NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a jury verdict convicting Appellant of 
violation of the Logan City disorderly conduct ordinance and from 
the sentence of the court each rendered on 1 February 1989. The 
appeal is taken to the Utah Court of Appeals from the Second 
Circuit Court, Cache County, Logan City Department pursuant to 
Rule 26 of the Utah Code Of Criminal Procedure title 77, chapter 
35. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED 
1. Does the Logan City Ordinance violate the protections 
afforded the Appellant under Article 1 Section 15 of the 
Constitution of the State of Utah and the First Amendment to the 
Constitution of the United States of America. 
2. Did the Logan City Ordinance have Constitutional 
application to the Appellant under the facts of this case. 
3. Did the Court properly and adequately instruct the jury. 
4. Did the Court, in admonishing the Appellant before the 
jury, diminish the possibility of a fair trial. 
1 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS GOVERNING CASE 
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, FIRST AMENDMENT; 
"[Religious and political freedom.] 
Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free 
exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, 
or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably 
to assemble, and to petition the Government for a 
redress of grievances. 
UTAH CONSTITUTION ARTICLE I SECTION 15 
"[Freedom of speech and of the press - Libel] 
No law shall be passed to abridge or restrain the 
freedom of speech or of the press. In all criminal 
prosecutions of libel the truth may be given in 
evidence to the jury; and if it shall appear to the 
jury that the matter charged as libelous is true, and 
was published with good motives, and for justifiable 
ends, the party shall be acquitted; and the jury shall 
have the right to determine the law and the fact". 
STATUTES AND RULES GOVERNING CASE 
Utah Code Annot. 76-9-102 
"<1) A person is guilty of disorderly conduct if: 
(a) He refuses to comply with the lawful order 
of the police to move from a public place, or knowingly 
creates a hazardous or physically offensive condition, 
by any act which serves no legitimate purpose; or 
<b) Intending to cause public inconvenience, 
annoyance, or alarm, or recklessly creating a risk 
thereof: 
(i) He engages in fighting or in violent, 
tumultuous, or threatening behavior; or 
(ii) He makes unreasonable noises in a public 
place; or 
(iii) He makes unreasonable noises in a private 
place which can be heard in a public place; or 
<iv) He engages in abusive or obscene language 
or makes obscene gestures in a public place; or 
(v) He obstructs vehicular or pedestrian 
traffic. 
2 
<2) ^Public place,' for the purpose of this section, 
means any place to which the public or a substantial 
group of the public has access and includes but is not 
limited to streets, highways, and the common areas of 
schools, hospitals, apartment houses, office buildings, 
transport facilities, and shops. 
(3) Disorderly conduct is a class C misdemeanor if the 
offense continues after a request by a person to 
desist. Otherwise it is an infraction". 
77-35-26. Rule 26 — Appeals. 
(1) An appeal is taken by filing with the clerk of the court from which the 
appeal is taken a notice of appeal stating the order or judgment appealed from 
and by serving a copy of it on the adverse party or his attorney of record. Proof 
of service of such copy shall be filed with the court. 
(2) An appeal may be taken by the defendant from: 
(a) the final judgment of conviction; 
(b) an order made, after judgment, affecting the substantial rights of. 
the defendant; 
(c) an interlocutory order when, upon petition for review, the appellate 
court decides that the appeal would be in the interest of justice; or 
(d) any order of the court judging the defendant by reason of a mental 
disease or defect incompetent to proceed further in a pending prosecution. 
(3) An appeal may be taken by the prosecution from: 
(a) a final judgment of dismissal; 
(b) an order arresting judgment; 
(c) an order terminating the prosecution because of a finding of double 
jeopardy or denial of a speedy trial; 
(d) a judgment of the court holding a statute or any part of it invalid; or 
(e) an order of the court granting a pretrial motion to suppress evi-
dence when, upon a petition for review, the appellate court decides that 
the appeal would be in the interest of justice. 
(4) (a) All appeals in criminal cases shall be taken within 30 days after the 
entry of the judgment appealed from, or, if a motion for a new trial or 
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arrest of judgment is made, within 30 days after notice of the denial of the 
motion is given to the defendant or his counsel. Proof of giving notice 
shall be filed with the court. 
(b) An appeal may not be dismissed except for a material defect in 
taking it, or for failure to perfect the appeal, or upon motion of the appel-
lant. The dismissal of the appeal affirms the judgment unless another 
appeal can be, and is, timely taken. 
(5) Cases appealed in which the defendant is unable to post bond shall be 
given a preferred and expeditious setting in the appellate court. 
(6) Appeals may be submitted on briefs and if an appellant's brief is filed 
the appeal shall be decided even though a party, upon notice of the hearing, 
fails to appear for oral argument. 
(7) The rules of civil procedure relating to appeals govern criminal appeals 
to the appellate court, except as otherwise provided. 
(8) In appeals to the Supreme Court of capital cases where the sentence of 
death has been imposed, appellant briefs shall be filed within 60 days of the 
filing of the record on appeal. Respondent briefs shall be filed within 60 days 
of receipt of the appellant brief. All issues to be raised on appeal shall be 
included by each party in its appellate brief. Appellant reply briefs shall be 
filed within 30 days of receipt of the respondent's brief. One 30-day extension 
of the 60-day filing period may be granted to each party, but only upon appli-
cation to the Supreme Court showing extraordinary circumstances warrant-
ing an extension. The Supreme Court shall schedule the oral arguments of the 
case to be heard not more than ten days after the date of filing of the final 
brief. Following oral arguments, the case shall be placed first on the Supreme 
Court's calendar, for expeditious determination. 
(9) After an initial appeal has been resolved, a subsequent appeal of a 
capital case where the sentence of death has been imposed may not be enter-
tained by any court, nor may a stay of execution of the sentence be granted, 
when the appeal does not raise any new matter not previously resolved or 
when new matter could have been raised at the previous appeal. 
(10) In capital cases where the sentence of death has been imposed, and the 
defendant has chosen not to pursue his own appeal, the case shall be automat-
ically reviewed by the Supreme Court within 60 days after certification by the 
sentencing court of the entire record, unless the time is extended by the 
Supreme Court for good cause. A case involving the sentence of death has 
priority over all other cases in setting for hearing and in disposition by the 
Supreme Court. 
(11) The rules of practice for the Court of Appeals and circuit courts pro-
mulgated by the Judicial Council and approved by the Supreme Court relat-
ing to appeals from circuit courts govern criminal as well as civil appeals. 
(12) An appeal may be taken to the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals, 
as is appropriate, from all final orders and judgments rendered in a district 
court or juvenile court under the provisions of this rule. 
(13) An appeal may be taken to the circuit court from a judgment rendered 
in the justice court in accordance wi|:h the provision of this rule, except: 
(a) The case shall be tried anew in the circuit court and the decision of 
the circuit court is final except where the validity or constitutionality of a 
statute or ordinance is raised in the justice court. 
(b) Within 20 days after receipt of the notice of appeal, the justice court 
shall transmit to the circuit court a certified copy of the docket, the origi-
nal pleadings, all notices, motions, and other papers filed in the case, and 
the notice and undertaking on appeal. 
(c) Stay of execution and relief pending appeal are under Rule 27. 
(d) All further proceedings are in the circuit court, including any pro-
cess required to enforce judgment. 
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12-8-5• Disturbing the peace. It shall be unlawful for any person 
to maliciously or wilfully disturb the peace and quiet of any 
neighborhood, family or person, by loud or unusual noise, or by 
tumultuous or offensive conduct, or by threatening, traducing, 
quarreling, challenging to fight or fighting within the limits of Logan 
City. 
12-8-6. Disturbances at public places prohibited. It shall be 
unlawful for any person to excite or cause disturbances or contention at 
any public place, public house, court, election, or any lawful meeting 
of citizens within the limits of Logan City. 
12-8-7. Disturbance of religious meeting prohibited. It shall be 
unlawful for any person to disturb at public assembly, congregated for 
religious'or other lawful purposes, within the limits of Logan City, by 
undue noise, or by offensive, unbecoming, or indecent behavior. 
12-8-8. Disorderly house. It shall be unlawful for any person to 
keep an ill-governed house, or to suffer or permit any drunkenness, 
quarreling, fighting, unlawful games, riotous or disorderly conduct 
whatever on his premises. 
12-8-9. Disorderly Conduct, (a) A person is guilty of disorderly 
conduct if; 
(1) He refuses to carply with the lawful order of the police to 
rove from a public place, or knowingly creates a hazardous or physically 
offensive condition, by any act which serves no legitimate purpose; or 
(2) Intending to cause public inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm, 
cr recklessly creating a risk thereof? 
(A) He engages in fighting or in violent, tumultuous, or 
threatening behavior; or 
(B) He makes unreasonable noises in a public place; or 
(C) He makes unreasonable noises in a private place which can be 
heard in a public place; or 
(D) He engages in abusive or obscene language or makes obscene 
gestures in a public place; or 
(E) He obstructs vehicular or pedestrian traffic. 
(b) "Public place," for the purpose of this section, means any 
place to which the public or a substantial group of the public has 
access and includes but is not limited to streets, highways, and the 
ccmnron areas of schools, hospitals, apartment houses, office buildings, 
transport facilities and shops. 
(c) Disorderly conduct is a class C misdemeanor if the offense 
continues after a request by a person to desist. Otherwise it is an 
infraction. 
(SBC. 12-8-9 ADDED 2/19/87) 
'THIS IS A COPY OF THE LOGAN CITY ORDINANCE ON FILE IN THE CITY OFFICES. 
THE MARGINAL NOTATIONS SHOWN APPEAR ON THE ORIGINAL.) 
(ffV 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
It is alleged by the arresting officer, one Roper, a peace 
officer, that on 11 December 1988 at about 1:30 a.m. (T. 26) 
Defendant drove his Datsun around the corner of 300 North 100 
East at a high rate of speed, swerving wide to the right then 
accelerating very rapidly past the parked position of the officer 
Roper at a speed which was estimated as 35 to 38 mph in a 25 mph 
zone <T. 27-28). Defendant stopped for the traffic semaphore and 
upon it changing to green pulled up in front of his business and 
exited his car. Roper, followed Defendant and determined to make 
contact based on the questionable turn and upon the estimation of 
speed in excess of posted limits. Upon being hailed by officer 
Roper, Defendant is alleged to have became immediately loud, 
belligerent, profane and uncooperative using offensive language 
and telling officer Roper to leave his private property (T. 40), 
to "get their fucking lights out of my car" etc. (T. 62). After 
alleged attempts to calm the situation, Defendant continued to 
remonstrate verbally, sometimes gesturing and standing as close 
as 18 inches to Roper (T.81). No threats were made, there was no 
fight and no squaring off of offers to combat by any party. 
Defendant was arrested and transported to jail whereupon 
Defendant quickly posted cash bail and walked back to his 
business, 1 block away. Another officer at the scene, one 
Monroe, taped most of the conversation and a transcript was put 
in evidence as follows at <t. 85 - 93); 
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DEF: You're two blocks down the road. 
MONROE: We weren't two blocks down the road. 
DEF: You were clear the hell down by Taco 
Time. 
MONROE: Do you really know or do you want 
to know where we really were? When you came 
around the corner, when you came around the 
corner awfully fast, right at the road here, 
we were parked just off the road, but we do 
need to see your drivers license. 
DEF: This is my property and your on it 
without my permission and that's it, that's 
what it boils down to. If it I'm tired of 
being harassed. 
MONROE: We need to see your registration, 
too, please. 
DEF: Bullshit, now look, your on my 
property, this is my building, I haven't done 
anything wrong, I want to be left alone, I'm 
tired of this harassment because I come out 
of my bar and you guys start harassing, and I 
don't want it. 
MONROE: We need to see your drivers license 
and registration. 
DEF: The registration is current it's on 
the back and your going to run it through the 
radio, you can find out just as quick as I 
can. 
MONROE: Look, Mr. Huber, were trying to be 
decent here. 
DEF: No, your not, why did you pull me 
over? 
MONROE: You were going too fast. 
DEF: No, it's because what time it is, 
because you have nothing else to do and 
that's it. 
MONROE: In just about two seconds, were not 
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going to be decent. Okay? We need to see the 
registration. 
DEF: Fine, fine, fine, get your light 
out. 
MONROE: We'll be with you in just a second. 
DEF: This is a bunch of crap. You know 
what the car--it— it's mine, it's always 
here. Get you fucking lights out of my car, 
goddamit, you guys piss me right off. 
MONROE: Here's the deal, Mr. Huber, your are 
under arrest for disorderly conduct. We're 
going to jail. Put your hands behind your 
back. Turn around and put your hands behind 
your back. 
DEF: What's the deal, here? 
MONROE: You are under arrest? 
DEF: For what? For what? Hold your 
horses, let me put my keys in my pocket. 
MONROE: Okay we'll do that. 
DEF: Turn my car off, can I turn my car 
off? 
MONROE: Not now. 
DEF: Wait a minute, can I call my attorney 
right now? This is stupider than hell, You 
guys want to go for this, you sit there in my 
car for no reason whatsoever. 
ROPER: Are they too tight? 
DEF: That ones way too tight. 
ROPER: Would you like me to loosen them a 
little bit for you? 
DEF: I'd like not to be wearing them. 
Hello. Can you explain to me why these guys 
are pulling this stunt? 
Monroe estimated the time of the contact as between 5 and 6 
8 
minutes (T. 93) . 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. The Logan City Ordinance is facially defective and 
should be declared violative of Article I Section 15 of the 
Constitution of the State of Utah in that; 
(a). Any abridgement of free speech is presumed void 
and is of primary importance to each member of society. 
<b) Regardless of whether Appellant is a person 
aggrieved by the unconstitutional aspects of the ordinance, he 
has standing to assert that unconstitutionality under the 
overbreadth doctrine. 
<c) The ordinance is void for vagueness in that there 
is no articulable standard with sufficient definition against 
which one may measure conduct. 
<d) The constitutional protections afforded by the 
First Amendment have become somewhat cluttered by varying 
interpretations of the doctrine of "fighting words" and of the 
doctrine of "clear and present danger". 
(e) All speech should be declared protected by the Utah 
Constitution, although if in connection with its use, the speaker 
becomes involved to the point that crimes are committed, that is 
his risk. 
2. The Logan City Ordinance is facially flawed and should 
be declared violative of the protections afforded to the 
appellant by the First Amendment of the Constitution of the 
9 
United States of America in that; 
(a) The terms abusive and obscene have, despite 
possible narrowing constructions by state courts, been declared 
by the United State Supreme Court to encompass protected speech 
<b) The ordinance as written may be used to prohibit 
and punish protected speech. 
(c) The terms "public inconvenience", "alarm", and 
"annoyance" as modified by "recklessly create a risk thereof" do 
not clearly limit prosecutions to speech consisting of "fighting 
words" or speech creating a "clear and present danger". 
3. The Logan City Ordinance, as applied to the appellant 
under the facts of this case, is violative of the protections 
afforded the appellant by Article I Section 15 of the Utah 
Constitution and the First Amendment to the Constitution of the 
United State of America in that; 
(a) The doctrines prescribing limitations to unfettered 
expression such as "fighting words" and "clear and present 
danger" have no application to confrontations between a citizen 
and police in arrest and detention situations; particularly when 
the initial contact was pursuant to police intrusion. 
(b) Absent a face to face personal insult intended and 
irretrievably destined to incited an immediate violent response, 
no speech will support a conviction of disorderly conduct. 
<c> Offensive and vulgar langauge, at least when not 
addressed to a captive audience, will not support a conviction of 
10 
disorderly conduct. 
<d) The language in evidence was, as used by appellant, 
devoid of prurient content or connotation and was no obscene. 
(e) Speech, to a public official, has a political 
aspect, and is absolutely protected, regardless of content, 
intended result or actual result. 
(f) Even if, under the standard of the U.S. Supreme 
Court, the physical aspects of the confrontation might be 
considered, the mixing of speech and physical behavior in making 
a determination of disorderly conduct is forbidden by the 
questioned ordinance in its present form. 
4. Instruction number 3 was given in error, over objection 
of appellant in that; 
(a) It was a paraphrase of the entire disorderly 
conduct ordinance. 
(b) It has no relation to the violation as pleaded by 
respondent. 
(c) No proof was adduced respecting many elements set 
forth in the instruction. 
(d) THe instructions expanded the case into non-verbal 
areas and would permitted the jury to combined verbal and non 
verbal conduct, which is not permitted by the ordinance, in 
reaching their circumstances. 
5. The Court, by admonishing Defendant before the jury 
damaged the appearance of impartiality and suggested to the jury 
11 
that he favored the Plaintiff's claims. 
6. The jury was not instructed that if the disorderly 
conduct was terminated by the actor on request, they could find 
the Appellant guilty of an infraction. 
POINT I 
THE LOGAN CITY ORDINANCE IS FACIALLY DEFECTIVE IN ITS 
OVERBREADTH. THE ORDINANCE CRIMINALIZES CONDUCT PROTECTED BY 
ARTICLE I SECTION 15 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF UTAH AND 
PROTECTED BY THE FIRST AMENDMENT OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. 
ARGUMENT 
Regardless of the whether or not the City of Logan has 
forbade and criminalized the conduct for which Defendant stands 
convicted, the questioned ordinance enfolds constitutionally 
protected conduct. An analysis of constitutional protections 
afforded by either the Utah Constitution or the United States 
Constitution compels a declaration that the challenged ordinance 
is unconstitutional. 
THE UTAH CONSTITUTION 
Article I Section 15 of the Utah Constitution provides that 
"no law shall be passed to abridge or restrain the freedom of 
speech or of the press". In KEARNS - TRIBUNE CORP. v. LEWIS 685 
P 2d 515, 521 (Utah 1984) the Utah Supreme Court held that "the 
freedom of speech and press are fundamental to the effective 
exercise of the ultimate power of the people". Appellant 
12 
submits that an infringement of this right as claimed by the 
Defendant, in light of the above cited case is so important that 
the time to assert the infringement need not await the perfect 
Plaintiff KEARNS (ibid). In the case of PRQVO CITY CORP, v. 
WILLDEN 100 Utah Adv. Rep 7 (1989), although the Utah Supreme 
Court held short of declaring an ordinance violative of the Utah 
Constitution, the Court employed language which might guide this 
court to utilize the Utah Constitution in deciding this case. 
Citing IN RE A CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT 
number CS-1 754 P 2d 633 (Utah 1988) for the proposition that a 
court should construe laws so as to carry out the legislative 
intent while avoiding constitutional conflicts; the court went 
on to observe that "in seeking a constitutional construction, we 
will not rewrite a statute or ignore its plain intent" WILLDEN 
(supra) was a freedom of speech case in which the Supreme Court 
observed, at page 7, that "in its zeal to eliminate such 
offensive behavior, Provo City has chosen to fashion a tool that 
sweeps far too deeply into the protected province of the First 
Amendment". This holding was made manifest, despite the 
conclusion by the court that the respondent city might forbid 
Defendant's alleged conduct by a properly worded ordinance. 
Looking at the instant case, appellant not only asks that 
this court review a city ordinance in light of the protection 
afforded by the Utah Constitution either under the concept of 
13 
"void for vagueness" or "overbreadth", * but also asserts that, 
unlike the situation in WILLDEN (supra), here we have the perfect 
appellant. See also JENKINS v, SWAN 675 P2d 1145 (Utah 1983). 
The Logan City Ordinance 12/8/9, with the exception of the 
penalty provisions, is but a duplication of the Utah disorderly 
conduct statute22. Disorderly conduct, as defined by the city 
ordinance or state statute, is not necessarily verbal although 
the respondent city elected, in this case, to proceed under 
12/8/9(c) which provides that a person is guilty of disorderly 
conduct if [while] 
"intending to cause public inconvenience, 
annoyance or alarm, or recklessly creating a 
risk thereof; he engages in abusive or 
obscene language or makes obscene gestures in 
a public place". 
Appellant submits that the city has thereby limited the scope 
of inquiry to verbal conduct and verbalization by appellant. In 
support of this contention, the courts attention is invited to 
the information filed in connection with appellants prosecution 
as well as to instruction number 2 given to the jury over the 
objection of Appellant (T. 153). 
The proscriptions of the ordinance as applied in this action 
are to the effect that abusive language, obscene language and 
1
. The United States Supreme Court has traditionally viewed 
vagueness and overbreadth as logically related or similar 
doctrines, see KOLENDER v. LAWSON 481 U.S. 352, 75 L Ed 2d 903, 
103 S. Ct. 
«. UCA 76-9-102 
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obscene gestures are forbidden. The court on motion of 
appellant, (T. 118 through 121) struck out "or makes obscene 
gestures" from the charge to the jury, recognizing that there was 
no evidence of any obscene gestures by the Defendant. The 
viability of the ordinance then requires that the court place a 
constitutional construction on each of the terms "public 
inconvenience"; "annoyance"; "alarm"; "recklessly"; "risk"; 
"abusive" and "obscene" in connection with verbal expression. 
As to the term "public inconvenience" appellant submits that 
the term is, by it's very nature, one which refers to areas of 
regulation which are civil in nature. Creation of utilities, 
banks and a host of other governmentally franchised entities are 
based upon a finding that they are required for the convenience 
of the public. Deference is often given to a finding of 
convenience, it being noted that many imprecise factors may bear 
on the public convenience. In Blacks Law Dictionary, Fourth 
Edition (1968) Convenient is defined variously as proper; just; 
suitable; fit; adapted; proper; or becoming appropriate. The 
term inconvenience then, is not subject to any easy resolution 
as to what standard should be applied or what minimum standard of 
conduct the ordinance requires. 
Perhaps verbal dissent is one of the most inconvenient facts 
of legislation and/or rule-making and much proposed legislation 
has come a cropper on account of dissent voiced by members of the 
legislative body or by members of the public. The public voice 
is 
is made manifest in varying ways, almost all of which are 
inconvenient to the administration of government. A speech by a 
fellow legislator, opposition from the assemblage at a town 
meeting, picketing and placarding before public 
buildings,arguments with civil servants in their offices or 
remonstrances with policemen on their beat are all inconvenient 
and do little, in and of themselves, to enhance the orderly and 
efficient administration of the existing public weal or to render 
the task of the public servants an easy one. Despite the 
inconvenience factor, unfettered expression is one of the most 
cherished and protected facets of our democratic system. Consider 
that there is scarcely a voluntary act that one can perpetrate 
which does not operate to the inconvenience of some member of the 
public. Must the jury then consider the possible affront to a 
member of the public or only the inconvenience to the system 
under which we live. The question is basic to democracy and 
requires a finer definition than can be made by an inquiry as to 
whether an act is "inconvenient". 
Public alarm is likewise subject to no easy definition. 
Certain members of the public are easily alarmed and it is 
submitted that any outcry, dissent or tumult will alarm some 
persons. Conversely, a verbalization, of whatever nature, in 
most situations, would not be sufficient to ignite a public 
panic, stampede or a general tumult. As is often observed, 
freedom of speech does not allow one to cry fire in a crowded 
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theater and thereby create a general alarm, but does this 
proscription apply to pure speech? However coarse or 
inappropriate, is not speech protected if only uttered in 
expression of one's views? Does the fact that there are those 
who might be willing to strike out upon hearing of any vulgarity 
make such speech any less protected? 
Now we come to annoyance. It is a fine question as to 
whether the public, as a body, can be annoyed. When it comes to 
verbal expression one must carefully distinguish that act from 
non-verbal conduct which creates a din, a foul stench or a 
noisome and untidy condition. Appellant would not argue but that 
the officers in this case were annoyed, but submits that too 
often this frustrating condition "goes with the job". 
All of what has been said regarding inconvenience, alarm or 
annoyance might be subject to a more easy resolution in favor of 
the ordinance by incorporation of the modifying term 
"unreasonable". Appellant submits, however, that with or 
without the non-existent modifier, the result would be the same. 
The process of finding a probable result of the proscribed verbal 
expression is unavoidably subject to imprecise direction and the 
ordinance gives too little guidance as to the multitude of 
possible situations which might be created by the questioned 
verbal expression and which must exist to sustain a conviction. 
Is not an expression of ones views, no matter how unreasonable 
his contentions be, a protected and permitted act? 
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Appellant contends that no amount of judicial construction 
(or reconstruction) will bring the questioned ordinance within 
constitutionally permissable bounds. 
Respecting the terms "abusive" and "obscene" much of the 
discussion with respect to the United States Consitutional 
argument has application here. In WILLDEN (SUPRA) the Utah Court 
apparently adopted the "overbreadth doctrine",cf STATE v. JORDAN 
665 P 2d 1280 (Utah 1983), and applied this doctrine to confer 
standing on one who would assert facial challenges. In light of 
the limitations imposed by this doctrine, the question then 
becomes, can the terms "abusive" and "obscene", as employed in 
the questioned ordinance, be saved by judicial construction. A 
valid judicial construction, sufficiently narrow to avoid 
constitutional strictures, said construction allowing it to meet 
constitutional muster, will prove fatal to a facial challenge by 
one not aggrieved thereby CHAPLINSKY v, NEW HAMPSHIRE (infra). 
Abusive, by whatever generally accepted definition 
encompasses constitutionally protected utterances. In the case 
of STATE v. JOHN W^ 418 A 2d 1097 14 Air 4th 1238 (Maine 1983) 
the Maine Court was called upon to construe a statute which 
declared actions to be disorderly conduct when: 
"in a public or private place, he knowingly 
accosts, insults, taunts or challenges any 
person with offensive, derisive, or annoying 
words, or by gestures or other physical 
conduct, which would in fact have a direct 
tendency to cause a violent response by an 
ordinary person in the situation of the 
person so accosted, insulted, taunted or 
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challenged"3. 
The statute was declared unconstitutional and the holding is 
discussed in detail at page 30, 31, and 32 of this brief. 
In light of the uncertainty of Federal First Amendment law 
with respect to the "fighting words" doctrine'* and the "clear and 
present danger" doctrine55, the case was primarily decided on the 
protection afforded by the Maine Constitution^. It seems that 
the Maine statute made a conscious effort to espouse the 
doctrines of CHAPLINSKY (infra) and SCHENCK (infra). Likewise 
some of the language in the Logan City Ordinance suggest that the 
drafting was done with CHAPLINSKY and SCHENCK doctrines in mind. 
Appellant suggests that all of that care to espouse these 
essential doctrines is for naught; neither "abusive" nor 
"obscene" satisfy the requirements of the Utah Constitution. 
Appellant suggests that this court likewise decide the 
instant case on State Constitutional grounds, thus avoiding the* 
inconsistencies and uncertainties of the federal doctrines of 
"fighting words" and "clear and present danger". In recent 
times, the most cogent analysis of a state statute in light of 
3
. 17 A.M.R.S.A. S 501(2) 
*. CHAPLINSKY v. NEW HAMPSHIRE 315 U.S. 568, 62 S. Ct. 766, 
86 L. Ed 1031 (1942) 
». SCHENCK v. U.S. 249 U.S. 47, 52, 39 S.Ct. 241, 249 
e
. The Maine Constitution Article I Section 4, in pertinent 
part, provides that "every citizen may freely speak, write and 
publish his sentiments on any subject, being responsible for 
abuse of this liberty;...." 
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CHAPLINSKY (supra) was in GOODING v. WILSON 405 U.S. 518, 92 S. 
Ct. 1103, 31 L. Fd. 2d 408 (1972) where, against the accusation 
of the dissenters that the court was "merely paying lip service 
to CHAPLINSKY", the court struck down the Georgia statute in that 
it could be applied "to utterances where there is no likelihood 
that the person addressed would make an immediate violent 
response". Thus in the 30 years since CHAPLINSKY, the court 
moved from words "whose speaking constitute a breach of the peace 
by the speaker...." to a measurement of the words in terms of the 
subjective response of the addressee. Not only does the shift 
fail to represent a rational refinement or extension of the same 
doctrine but it forces a subjective approach into an area crying 
for a workable objective standard. To add to the confusion, 
consider the statement of the "clear and present danger" doctrine 
as found in LANDMARK COMMUNICATIONS INC v. VIRGINIA 435 U.S. 829, 
98 S. Ct. 1535, 56 L.Ed 2d (1978). The court said 
"properly applied, the test requires a court 
to make its own inquiry into the imminence 
and magnitude of the danger said to flow from 
the particular utterance and then to balance 
the character of the evil, as well as its 
likelihood, against the need for free and 
unfettered expression". 
Clear and present danger then, has been drawn into the arena of 
subjectivity, balancing the nature of the conduct against 
anticipated evils with a result based on each courts inquiry into 
the facts and construction thereof. 
Many states, in the wake of GOODING (supra), have sought to 
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fashion their own standard; perhaps the Utah legislature proposes 
UCA 76-9-102 as a standard satisfying constitutional mandate. In 
STATE v. JOHN W. (supra) the Maine Court notes the efforts of 
other states to define fighting words and comments as follows: 
"Many other courts, faced with the task of 
determining what constitutes fighting words, 
have applied tests quite similar to that 
applied by § 501(2), tests which are 
objective, but which focus on the context of 
the incident rather than solely on the 
content of the words. See, e.g., HAMMOND v. 
ADKISSON, 536 F 2d 237 (8th Cir. 1976) (words 
must be employed "under such circumstances 
that they are likely to arouse an immediate 
and violent anger in the person to whom the 
words were addressed" (emphasis in 
original)); MORRIS v. STATE, Fla., 335 So. 2d 
1, 2 (1976) and HARBIN v. STATE, Fla.App., 
358 So. 2d 856, 857 (1978)(overturning 
convictions for using profanity to a police 
officer on the ground that the words did not 
"tend to incite an immediate breach of the 
peace"); COMMONWEALTH v. A JUVENILE, 368 
Mass. 580, 587, 344 N.E. 2d 617, 624-625 
(1975)(fighting words must be "personally 
abusive ... in the sense that they are a face 
to face personal insult," but " the 
determination may not rest on subjective 
perceptions since 'an undifferentiated 
fear ... of disturbance is not enough to 
overcome the right to freedom of 
expression,'" quoting TINKER v. PES MOINES 
INDEPENDENT COMMUNITY SCHOOL DIST.. 393 U.S. 
503, 89 S. Ct. 733, 21 L. Ed. 2d 731 (1969); 
STATE v. HQSKINS. 35 Conn. Sup. 587, 401 A2d 
619 (1978) ("^fighting words concept has two 
aspects ... the quality of the words 
themselves ... [and] the circumstances under 
which the words are used"); STATE v. 
AUTHELET, R.I., 385 A. 2d 642, 649 (1978) 
"[fighting words] must be personally abusive 
and inherently likely to provoke violent 
reaction'). 
One might question whether any of the tests above propounded 
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would satisfy the constitutional mandate but most courts seem to 
agree that the words must constitute a personal insult directed 
at a person with intention to provoke an immediate violent 
response. This construction would seem to demand more of an 
ordinance than Logan's enactment would provide in that the 
contested ordinance inadequately deals with the result or 
probable result of the speech. Perhaps the best test is no test 
at all, appellant suggests that this Court should take the 
position that speech, though protected, may lead to criminal 
conduct which might ultimately involve the speaker and the 
speaker thereby embarks into certain areas at his risk. 
Certainly this standard would not preclude criminal sanctions in 
the area of nuisance, assault, terroristic threat, and obscenity 
as well as any other essentially non verbal conduct now mentioned 
within the disorderly conduct ordinance. 
THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
in KOLENDER v. LAWSON 461 U.S. 352, 75 L.Ed. 2d 903, 103, S.Ct. 
1955 (1983) the Court said at page 908; 
"In evaluating a facial challenge to a State 
law; A Federal Court must, of course, 
consider any limiting construction that a 
State Court or enforcement agency has 
proffered"'7' 
The recent case of PR0V0 CITY CORPORATION v. WILLDEN (supra) 
seems to ascribe to the FLIPSIDE (infra) doctrine, in each case 
•*. Quoting from HOFFMAN ESTATES v. FLIPSIDE, HOFFMAN 
ESTATES. INC. 455 U.S. 489, 494 n. 5, 71 L. Ed. 2d 362, 102 S. 
Ct. 1180 (1982) 
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emphasis is upon questions of free speech and free association. 
The court in KOLENDER (supra) went on to say that; 
"the void for vagueness doctrine requires 
that a penal statute define the criminal 
offense with sufficient definiteness that 
ordinary people can understand what conduct 
is prohibited and in a manner that does not 
encourage arbitrary and discriminatory 
enforcement" 
Aside from the previous discussion regarding the terms 
"public inconvenience", annoyance" and "alarm". This court may 
be assisted by Federal cases construing "abusive" and "obscene", 
Respecting the term "abusive", in GOODING v, WILSON (supra at p. 
415) the court struck down a State statute,declaring that abusive 
encompassed other than "fighting words". 
In the case of COHEN v. CALIFORNIA 403 U.S. 15, 23, 29 L. 
Ed. 2d 284, 91 S. Ct 1780 (1971) it was held that merely 
offensive or vulgar language could not be punished, at least when 
addressed to an audience which was not captive. While it is well 
settled that obscenity is not protected speech, the coarse and 
vulgar terms as employed by appellant certainly could not be 
judicially construed as having prurient connotations and the city 
did not specifically suggest otherwise at the trial, apparently 
concentrating on the "fighting words" aspect of the utterances of 
appellant. LEWIS v. NEW ORLEANS (supra) struck down and 
ordinance that made it unlawful: 
"for any person wantonly to curse or revile 
or use obscene or opprobrious language toward 
or with reference to any member of the City 
Police while in actual performance of his 
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duty" 
The federal cases cited, along with ROSENFELD v. NEW 
JERSEY0 and BROWN v. OKLAHOMA* which were remanded for 
reconsideration in light of GOODING and COHEN (supra) as well as 
the cases remanded for reconsideration in light of LEWIS (infra) 
they being LUCAS v. ARKANSAS10. ROSEN v. CALIFORNIA11, and KARLEN 
v. CINCINNATI18, make it abundantly clear that appellants speech, 
in the instant case, did not come within the area of fighting 
words. Regardless of intrusion into that area, the speech 
complained of in this case is protected. In summary the City has 
adopted a content based speech regulation and has thereby 
impinged upon the guarantees of free speech enjoyed by us all. 
POINT II 
THE LOGAN CITY ORDINANCE 12/8/9 IS OVERBROAD AND IS 
UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE AS APPLIED TO THIS DEFENDANT IN THE 
SITUATION IN WHICH HE WAS INVOLVED AND IS THEREBY VIOLATIVE OF 
THE PROTECTIONS AFFORDED THE DEFENDANT BY ARTICLE I SECTION 15 OF 
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF UTAH AND BY THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. 
Appellant contends that under the facts of this case, his 
&
. 408 U.S. 901 
9
. 408 U.S. 914 
10
. 416 U.S. 919 
11
. 416 U.S. 923 
1S:
. 416 U.S. 924 
24 
actions were protected and that his conduct did not constitute a 
crime and that the prosecution and conviction that resulted 
therefrom violated rights afforded him under the due process 
clause and equal protection clause of the Constitution of the 
United States of America and parallel provisions of the Utah 
Constitution. The record of this trial is replete with 
references to coarse and vulgar utterances where the terms 
••goddamn", "fuck", "fucking", "bullshit", "piss me off" and 
"hell" were employed <T. 97 through 100). On the other hand, 
there is no real issue but that the only purpose of appellant in 
making these utterances was to question the authority of two 
police officers to detain him, cite him and search his vehicle 
and for the further reason to assert his right to be free from 
the intrusion of the officers onto his property and into his 
affairs. Appellant asserts that he has the right to inquire, 
whether or not his opinion enjoys any support in the law. 
In LEWIS v. CITY OF NEW ORLEANS 415 U.S. 130, 93 S.Ct. 970, 
39 L.Ed. 2d 214 (1974) Justice Powell in concurrence said; 
"The issue in a case of this kind is whether 
^fighting words' were used. Here a police 
officer, while in performance of his duty, 
was called xg d m f police'. If 
these words had been addressed by one citizen 
to another, face to face and in a hostile 
manner, I would have no doubt that they would 
be "fighting words". But the situation may 
be different where such words are addressed 
to a police officer trained to exercise a 
higher degree of restraint than the average 
citizen". 
Mr. Justice Powell went on to find that the Louisiana 
25 
statute; 
"confers on police a virtually unrestrained 
power to arrest and charge persons with a 
violation .... the present type of ordinance 
tends to be invoked only when there is no 
other valid basis for arresting an 
objectionable or suspicious person" 
A good many State Courts have adopted the reasoning of Mr. 
Justice Powell in LEVIS (supra), appellant submits that the 
reasoning has singular application to the facts of the instant 
case. 
ORATOWSKI v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION 3 111. App. 2d 551, 
123 N.E. 2d 146 (1954) at page 151 observed that; 
"words addressed to an officer in an insolent 
manner do not, without any other overt act, 
tend to breach the peace because it is the 
sworn duty and obligation of a peace officer 
not to breach the peace and beyond this to 
conduct himself to keep others from so doing. 
He has an obligation to exercise a great deal 
of restraint in dealing with the public and 
should not permit abusive statements to so 
arouse him that he will commit a breach of 
the peace". 
No comment more adequately summarizes and narrows the issue 
presented by this case than that found in HARBIN v. STATE (supra) 
where the Florida Court said that [in these prosecutions]"the 
police officer is the only person who arguably could have been 
incited to an immediate breach of the peace". 
In the instance case, the officers effected a traffic stop 1 3 
1 3
. Although not placed at issue at the trial level nor 
argued here, the circumstances of the stop suggest the 
possibility of a pretextual stop.(T. 34-35) 
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<T. 39-40). A claim is made that the detained person at once 
became argumentative and profane and ordered the officers from 
his property <T. 40-42). On cross examination. Defendant's 
counsel elicited the following testimony (T. 97 line 16 to T. 101 
line 2) as follows; 
"Q. And so he reached in the vehicle and 
produced his registration; is that right? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. Okay. Didn't take a gun out or anything 
like that? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. So, you arrested him? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Okay. So, you had his drivers' license, 
you had his registration, everything you'd 
asked for; but then you arrest him anyway? 
A. Because of the situation, I didn't see 
any other way out of it. 
Q. Why? What else were you going to do at 
that point, that you were afraid that he was 
going to interfere with? 
A. Because he had already demonstrated to me 
disorderly conduct. 
Q. So, you didn't--so, whether he had said 
that last NGet your fucking light out of my 
car, goddamit', you would have arrested him 
anyway? 
A. That's hard to say. If he would have 
settled down, probably--it's hard to say. I 
can't sit--you know, sit back and second-
guess what we were going to do. 
Q. Well, what you--don't you think that it 
was maybe just the shock of that last 
obscenity, as it were? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. You don't think it was that? 
A. That was the fin--that was the straw that 
broke the camel's back, so to speak. 
Q. At that point, you became angry; is that 
right? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Did you feel like the next thing that was 
going to happen was he was going to swing on 
somebody? 
A. I felt that was going to happen prior to 
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that. 
Q. But it didn't? 
A. No, sir. It did not. 
Q. And he got his driver's license out and 
his registration out, and he didn't hit 
anybody; is that right? 
A. That is correct. 
Q. So, actually, at that point, I suppose, 
from what you've said, that the situation was 
pretty well defused? 
A. Nb, sir. It was not. 
Q. Why didn't you just, at that point, you 
had his driver's license, registration, write 
him a ticket for speeding, and leave? 
A. Because that' not the way it happened. 
Q. Well, then, this is wrong, this 
recording? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. When did he hand you the registration? 
A. If he handed it to me, it would have 
been — it occurred right after, NThis is a 
bunch of crap. You know that the car's 
mine'. 
Q. Okay. So that's when he handed you the 
registration? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. So, you had the registration, you had the 
driver's license? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And then you arrested him? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. So that was, I take it, a forgone 
conclusion at that point, you were going to 
arrest him anyway? 
A. At that point, yes, sir. 
Q. Okay. Whatever he came up with? 
A. That 's correct. 
Q. So, that was really before he said 
anything, any swear words for quite a while, 
for at least a page of testimony here, he 
hadn't sworn once during that time. You—so, 
you'd made the decision prior to—before you 
even engaged him with the tape recorder; is 
that right? 
A. No, sir. That's not correct. 
Q. So, it wasn't the swearing, that's not 
the reason that you arrested him; is that 
what you're saying? 
A. No, sir. That's not what I'm saying. 
Q. You did arrest him for the swearing? 
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A. That was part of it. 
Q. Okay. Because you felt that anybody that 
said fuck in Logan City was guilty of 
disorderly conduct; is that correct? 
Mr. Brady: Your Honor, I'm going to object. 
It's argumentative. 
THE COURT: I think it is. I'll sustain 
it1*. 
Appellant submits that all salient portions of the 
confrontation that led to the arrest are read from a transcript 
of a recording made at the scene (T. 85-91). It is probably not 
important in this case but the contention of officer Roper and 
Monroe in light of officer Ropers testimony that the first 
statement of import was "I need to see your driver license" and 
that is the subject under discussion at the commencement of the 
tape (T.40). The conclusion is inescapable that there was no 
real activity perceived by the officer that was disorderly until 
the appellant said "Get you fucking lights out of my car, 
Goddamit you guys piss me right off" <T. 88-89. This conclusion 
is fortified by the exchange <T. 96 line 25, T. 97 lines 1 & 2) 
"G. So that last swear word was the one that 
keyed the whole thing I take it. 
A. That kinda--yes sir". 
Interestingly enough, for all of the discussion during and 
after the arrest, the officer never do answer appellants queries 
as to why he is being arrested. Perhaps, the arrest was for 
%
*m Appellant submits that this ruling was clearly 
erroneous. 
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speeding155 and the other charge was by way of afterthought. 
Although the officer made much of continual profanity, officer 
Roper testifying in response to the question, 
MQ: As he continued to talk to officer Monroe 
he kept using the work vfuck', is that right? 
A: That's correct". <T. 51) 
Officer Monroe stated that his conversation with appellant 
was almost entirely recorded (T. 84) and the only use of the "FM 
word is concerning the shining of a flashlight into appellants 
car. Officer Monroe also stated that Appellant calmed 
considerably upon being told he was under arrest <T. 93). 
Despite the apparent inconsistencies in the accounts of the 
participants, the fact remains that the officer dealt with a 
difficult and taxing conversation with an argumentative citizen 
by the simple expediency of arresting him and taking him to jail. 
In STATE v. JOHN W. (supra) the court found facts as follows: 
"With these general principles in mind and 
viewing the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the State, we turn to the facts 
of this case. Shortly after 1:00 a.m. on the 
night of April 1, 1979, John W., a juvenile, 
was driving his car in Saco accompanied by 
his older sister Maria. Saco police officer 
Ronald Rochefort stopped them, approached the 
car and asked John for his license and 
registration. When Maria asked why they had 
been stopped, Rochefort said nothing. Maria 
got out of the car and again asked why they 
had been stopped and Rochefort again refused 
to answer., Maria came out into the street 
and began yelling. Rochefort took her back 
1=s
. Defendant was cited for violation of Logan City 
Ordinance 42-7-1 speeding 25 in a 35 mph zone, the jury acquitted 
him of that charge. 
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to the sidewalk and went back to the driver's 
window, whereupon Maria began calling him a 
"fucking pig" and prevented him from talking 
to the driver. Rochefort arrested Maria for 
disorderly conduct, took her to his car and 
handcuffed her. She later entered a guilty 
plea to the charge of disorderly conduct. 
Shortly after Maria's arrest Officer Bradley 
Paul arrived in another police cruiser. John 
asked both Rochefort and Paul what was going 
on. Officer Paul walked toward John and 
advised him that Rochefort has arrested his 
sister for disorderly conduct. John 
hollered, NI want to know what the hell is 
going on.' Officer Paul again explained that 
this sister has been arrested for disorderly 
conduct. John kept repeating, N I want to 
know what the hell is going on.' Officer 
Paul tried to explain to John that he should 
come to the station and arrange for bail for 
his sister. John became more abusive so 
Officer Paul turned and walked back to his 
cruiser. As Officer Paul walked away, John 
screamed at him,xHey, turn around and come 
back here' and NHey, you fucking pig, you 
fuckin kangaroo.' Officer Paul then ordered 
John to get back into his car. John 
hollered, xFuck you.' Officer Paul thereupon 
arrested him." 
Considering those facts, the court observed that; 
"In this case, the police initially had 
intruded into the activities of the person 
involved. The police had accosted the 
juvenile and his sister and had arrested his 
sister. Persons involved in an arrest have a 
right under both the Maine and the United 
States Constitution, to remonstrate, to 
object, or to protest the arrest. We do not 
condone or encourage abusive language, but 
even crude speech may be entitled to 
constitutional protection, COHEN v. 
CALIFORNIA. supra, and the right of that 
constitutional protection is heavier after a 
police intrusion. The right to remonstrate 
against a police intrusion into our 
activities is one element which distinguishes 
our democratic society from the police state. 
See 9 Harv. Civil Rights-Civil Liberties 
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L.Rev. 1, 10 (1974). 
(arguing that speech addressed to any public 
official has a political aspect, bringing it 
within the central concerns of the first 
amendment). In PEOPLE v. JUSTICE, 57 
Ill.App. 3d 164, 166, 14 111.Dec. 836, 838, 
372 N.E. 2d 1115, 1117 (1978), the Appellate 
Court of Illinois, citing ORATQWSKI, (supra) 
said: ^Arguing with a police officer, even if 
done loudly, will not of itself constitute 
disorderly conduct ....' Defendant's conduct 
may have been intemperate, unreasonable and 
unjustified,. but there is no proof that her 
action caused public disorder." 
The Maine Court went on to hold that; 
" CThel language and accompanying conduct 
while engaged in the permissable activity of 
verbally protesting the arrest were not so 
egregiously offensive and likely to provoke a 
violent response as to forfeit the protection 
of (the State and Federal Constitution)" 
The respondent, at trial, made much of the police officers 
subjective impressions; 
"The situation began to deteriorated just 
most immediately" (T. 82 line 25) 
...I was standing just to--just behind 
officer Roper and just a couple of feet to 
the right of him when I saw the situation 
deteriorating to the point ..• that I felt it 
was becoming a fight. (T.82 lines 14-18) 
The situation, as I said, got worse, and by 
my appraisal of worse, he became closer, I 
was backing up from him, and at times, he was 
within 6 to 8 inches from my face, yelling at 
me...(T.42 lines 3-6)" 
This is always the problem with subjective impressions, 
certainly there are situations in which an unarmed citizen would 
deliberately challenge and fight with two armed police officers-
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but can we, from an objective standpoint, credit this impression. 
One might ask if there was a threat with a show of force or 
violence, why wasn't appellant arrested for assault?10 
STATE v, JOHN W.(supra) also considered the case of NORWELL 
v. CINCINNATI 414 U.S. 14 94 S.Ct. 187, 38 L.Ed. 2d 170 (1973) 
and analyzes its applications to argument with arresting officers 
and observed; 
"the court held that a 69-year-old man who 
objected to detention by a police officer in 
a manner that was "hostile" and "annoying" to 
the officer, could not be punished for 
disorderly conduct because the record clearly 
showed that there was no "abusive language or 
fighting words." The court did not attempt 
to suggest what would have constituted such 
language. It is at least clear, however, 
that "fighting words" implies a direct, face-
to-face confrontation and provocation; it is 
also particularly clear that arguing with an 
arresting officer is not per se disorderly 
conduct. We must bear in mind Justice 
Harlan's characterization, in COHEN, of those 
who might be willing to strike out upon the 
hearing of any vulgarity as "lawless and 
violent." 403 U.S. at 23, 91 S.Ct. at 1787. 
See also PAPISH v. BOARD OF CURATORS, 410 
U.S. 667, 93 S.Ct. 1197, 35 L.Ed. 2d 618 
(1973); Annot., 39 L.Ed. 2d 925 (1976)" 
In conclusion it seems apparent that both State and Federal 
courts have been reluctant, if they have not refused, to extend 
the fighting words doctrine to confrontations between officers 
and citizens in arrest or detention situations. It is suggested 
that this court hold that speech addressed to any public official 
Logan City Ordinance 12-8-2 
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has a "political aspect", bringing it within the central concerns 
of the First Amendment and at least this court should require 
that as a result of the verbal conduct a public disorder 
occurred. %yf 
POINT III 
THE JURY WAS IMPROPERLY AND INADEQUATELY INSTRUCTED BY THE 
COURT. 
Appellant contends that the court erred in giving 
instructions 2 and 3. Each of these were objected and excepted to 
during trial (T. 121)(T.154) Appellant contended in arguments 
throughout the trial that the ordinance was unconstitutional and 
declined to participate in any attempt to clothe the ordinance 
with a constitutionally permissable interpretation. Since the 
court was bound, upon giving instruction number 2, to modify or 
explain it in light of the required elements of "fighting words" 
and "clear and present danger", it was plain error to fail to 
instruct the jury that they must find these elements beyond a 
reasonable doubt. STATE v. HANSEN 732 P 2d 127; 45 Ut.Adv.Rep. 
19 (1983) held that it is the duty of the judge to instruct the 
jury on all relevant law. Accordingly the judge may, over 
objection of Defendant's counsel give any instruction that is in 
proper form, states the law correctly and does not not prejudice 
xyr





THE COURT IMPROPERLY CHARGED THE JURY WITH THE ELEMENTS OF 
DISORDERLY CONDUCT. 
The giving of instruction number 3 was fatal to a fair trial 
of the case. The Respondent was bound by their pleading (see 
information in file) and the case not only was limited thereby 
but in addition, no proof was adduced which bore upon the other 
portions of the of ordinance incorporated in instruction number 
3. Appellant did timely object (T.154). One would have to 
speculate, in light of the giving of instruction number 3, as to 
whether Appellant's conviction by the jury was based on verbal or 
non-verbal conduct. STATE v. HANSEN (ibid) 
POINT V 
THE COURT, IMPROPERLY, AND AT THE INSTANCE OF THE 
PROSECUTION, ADMONISHED THE DEFENDANT AND COUNSEL IN THE PRESENCE 
OF JURY. 
During the respondents case in chief, commencing at (T.61 
line 8) and ending at (T. 62 line 5) the following exchange took 
place. 
"MR. BRADY: Your Honor, can I — maybe we need 
to stop. I notice Mr. Huber's having 
problems controlling himself. I wonder if we 
need a drink of water or something for him. 
THE COURT: Mr. Huber, I--
MR. HUBER: I'm having a hard time swallowing 
this. 
MR. BRADY". Maybe he needs a drink. 
THE COURT: Well, I realize that, but I'm 
admonishing you, Mr. Huber, to not make any 
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l^ 'id ^: uk \y . I'm sorry, your Ho: 
THE C Y o u ' l l L r - v / o u r chai, n- ' 
t e s t i l > v,: y u m t u r n \ ., -.:;d 1 --. s 
want you Lo s h a k e yo u. ,vi ***e wa y 
a n o t h e r . Ju-si: s i t t h e r e and l i s t e n t o t h e - • 
MR. LAURITZt£N: W e l l , I o b j e c t t>; t h a t , you : 
Honoi ; ' r in ^ ^ - r t a i n l y do *-ha- 4-Kof-'^
 l l 0 u 
t e s t i n g 
THE CO uu ^ iiuL yc , , i J i t i n my 
C o u r t , 11 1 L - a u r i t z e n I " : • * uu t o u n d e r s t a n d 
t h a t 
MR. LAURITZEh; w e n , I continue 
objection, because I can't believe--
THE COURT! You ?:-a:, havo y- . .yjectj 
may proceed. 
MR. LAURITZEN: ^h.r^ V'JU. 
I"" I. .Mi 11 mi I 1 1 ( ,«• nliiiiii j I i"» Liu'iill t h e r e q u i r e m e n t o f i m p a r t i a l i t y by 
Llie j u d g e WHS s e v e r e l y e r o d e d ,1 n t h e e y e s of t h e j m y b> L h l a 
e x c h a n g e . 
CONCLUSION 
light : . j i .:. c t t h a t t h e Logan C i t y 0 r d i n a n c e I s 
f a c i a 1 ,1 y <i, I v f v,«;" 1 i v ip•> -n, ,11, • I v 1 , * 1, j 11 <.,', I I |. r ,, I, e , • I 1 1 n,,; •„ n £ i ,-, 11 , ;J (•:! d 
Appellant nndloi, Llie Constitution o± Lhe State of Utah and the 
Constitution of the United States of America niul considering that 
t h e 1 oqijinii I ' i l , 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 i""ii 1 H « 1 mi mi I III! i n 11 ill d 11 Il h e 
cons111u 11 o 11 a I I y app 11 ed to the Defenda 111 under 111e facts of i, h is 
case, Appellants cor 1 v i ction shou1d be reversed and the Appe11ant 
should be discharged, 
1 11 I .proper °^ d inadequate instructions given to 
Unc" jury :i * <-i s »r <* i udi ui n 1 > n^diii * • ^ r-'-••** * fj,ven 
in II II II 1 1 \ e L " ise 
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should be reversed and remanded for a new trial. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this A^ZL day of May, 1989. 
Attorney for D 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on the M. day of May, 1989, I 
mailed four (4) copies of the foregoing Appellant's Brief to 
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Il II I II I II . 
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1
 II I 
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II r" III in in, in mi * 
THE COURT: Mr Pubpr 
HUBER; ' • ' , - * * . - - r.. *rt b l o w i n g t h i s 
* 
r e a l i z e t ^ a t ; I 'm 
aditionxshiw • n u u e i , LU nut iuajs>e g e s t u r e s i n t h e 
p r e s e n c e , , u ry . 
*kav .onor. 
i i III i Ihmrt1 I I i "i I I I 
whor ynyr " .* . want you to bltake / 
head one way or i i io thor , J i n f nM * hi r r ind l i s t e n t o t lm 
1 L, I.iLllktLiIiJ, IKJl , I ul in i t U LlialL
 9 „ l III 
He Cttii c e r t a i n l y do t h a t , H i n t ' s not I eul imony . 
THE nillhl llo s not i|oiiM| I o do i t i n my L o u x t , 
Mr. Laur iLzen . I waul ^uii Lo unde is ta iu l I ha t 
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MR. LAURITZEN: Well, I continue ray objection, 
because I can't believe— 
THE COURT: You may have your objection. 
You may proceed. 
MR. LAURITZEN: Thank you. 
Q (By Mr. Lauritzen) Okay. And then didn't Monroe 
say, "Well, we'll be with you in just a second", riqht after 
he said, "Fine, fine, fine"? 
A He could have done. 
Q Okay. And then didn't Mr. Huber say, "This is a 
bunch of crap, you know what the car—it is mine, it's 
always here. Get your fucking light out of my car, goddamit, 
you guys piss me right off"? you remember him saying that, 
don't you? 
A I do. 
Q And that's when you shine your light in his car? 
A I wasn't at that time, no. 
Q Okay. What were you doing then? 
A I had just come from shining the light in the car, 
and was walking around the back of his car over to where 
they were standing there. 
Q Okay. And at that point, then, did Officer Monroe 
say, "Here's the deal, Mr. Huber, you're under arrest for 
disorderly conduct"? 
A Let's put—let me try and put it in perspective. 
*?. 
forward and initiated the contact with the defendant. 
Q And what did you hear Officer Roper say with his 
contact with the defendant? 
A I recall that he ask—or informed him as to why 
we had stopped him# asked him for his driver's license. It 
was at that time that the situation went downhill. 
Q Okay. Downhill can mean a lot of things; we go 
tubing down hills, Officer. 
A Okay. 
Q What's downhill mean? "What happened? 
A The defendant began to get very verbally abusive, 
very hostile towards Officer Roper. 
Q Okay. Let me stop you againf Officer. Verbally 
abusive; what do you mean by verbally abusive? 
A Okay. He was—maybe I can put this in— 
Q Tell me what you observed. 
A Where they were, where they were standing, 
basically. 
Officer Roper was just in front of him, a couple 
of feet in front of him, probably five feet in front of him, 
Mr. Roper was standing very close to the face of Officer 
Roper, approximately this close, it— 
Q You're indicating 18 inches? 
A Approximately 18 inches away. 
Q Okay. 
til 
A Officer Roper tried to explain why we were there. 
The situation began with Mr. Huber yelling, "Bullshit. This 
is my property. You have—do you have—why, or do you have 
my speed on radar?" We indicated that we did not have a 
radar, and that we did not have him clocked on radar, but 
that it was simply a visual observation, 
I recall that the situation cot progressively 
worse, with Mr. Huber raising his arm3 and saying, "This 
is bullshit. Fuck you. Get off of ray property. When it 
comes right down to it, you don't bave any good reasons why 
you stopped me. This is my property, now git". 
Q Okay. 
A I carry a tape recorder, a small tape recorder 
with me. And as I said, I was standing just to—just behind 
Officer Roper and just a couple of feet to the right of him. 
When I saw the situation deteriorating to the point— 
Q Let m e — 
A —that I felt that it was becoming a fight. 
Q Okay. You thought it was becoming a fight? 
A Yes. 
Q Let me stop you right here, that's the time frame 
from your contact to this time that you're saying it's 
deteriorating and you think it's becoming a fioht? 
A The situation began to deteriorate•just' almost 
immediate lyf — 
question as to our integrity and to how many opportunities 
we g&ve Mr. Huber to settle down, to give us his driver's 
license as we had asked. 
When I finally got the tape recorder started—I 
had met Mr. Huber one time prior, never obtained his 
driver's license or anything like that, I had simply met him 
down at the Vault, where I believe he's the owner or 
manager, I'm not certain, and I figured because the 
situation was becoming so violent, I felt that there was 
going to be a fight, I felt that Officer Roper was in 
danger because of the close proximity and the language being 
used, and the tone of voice being used, that I figured, 
maybe, because I know him, I'll step in and maybe it'll 
diffuse itself. 
Q Okay. And did you step in, then? 
A Yes, sir. I did. And what I — 
Q Okay. What did you say when you stepped in? 
A What I've got is the taped conversation from 
what—pretty much where it began, with me. 
£ Okay. Okay. So, there is a taped conversation 
then that you had transcribed; is that correct? 
A Yes, sir. 
Q Okay. And does this start on your immediate 
contact with Mr. Huber, or you broke in for Officer Roper, 
or is there some-lapse in tine? Or tell me what you recall. 
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A As I recall, when I finally got the tape 
recorder started, I'm not—as I recall, I had just got the 
tape recorder started, then I initiated contact with 
Mr• Huber. 
Q Okay. And you have a cony of that in front of 
you? 
A Yes, sir. 
Q Okay. And that start3 with Mr. Huber saying, 
"You're two blocks down the road". 
A Yes, sir. He— 
Q Had you made any contact with Mr. Huber prior to 
this conversation right here? Had you asked him any 
questions prior to that coming out? 
A Just simply for his driver's license when he made 
the stop. Thatfs all I—yeah. 
Q Okay. 
A It's just when I informed, him as to needing his 
driver's license. 
Q Okay. And so you stopped—or you stepped up, and 
he said, "You're two blocks down the road"? 
A Yes, sir. 
Q Do you recall if that was just his comment, or 
was that in response to a question? 
A That was in response to us telling him why we had 
stopped him, where we were. 
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Q When you say "we" , who's doing the talking? 
A That was Officer Roper speaking at that time. 
Q Officer Roper's talhirg to him? 
A Yes, sir. 
Q And this is a response f^ om Mr. Huber? 
A Yes, sir. 
Q Okay. And I d'ssuipe th<*i i t goes verbat im— 
A Yes , s i r . 
Q —as to that, wh"»t you had on the tape recording 
here? 
A Yes, sir. 
Q And you step in and say, wWe werenft two blocks 
down the road"? 
A That's correct* 
Q Mr. Huber savs, "You were clear the hell down by 
Taco Time"? 
A Yes, sir, 
Q And your response? Why don't you read to me what 
your response was, and I'll— 
A My response was, "bo vcu really know—or do you 
vant to know where wo really r'ere?,r I says, "When you came 
around the corner, when you cane around the corner awfully 
fast, right at the road here, we were parked just off the 
r
°ad, but we do need to see yo^ ir driver's license". 
Q And Mr. Hube^'s response is, "This is my property 
and you're on it without my permission and that's it, that's 
what it boils down to. If it—I'm tired of being harassed"? 
A The next—the next line was, "We need to see your 
registration, too, please". 
Q Now, let me just stop you right here, Officer. 
"We need to see your registration, too, please"; has he 
already given you his driver's license, or— 
A Finally—some time during the conversation, he had 
relented and did produce his driver's license. 
Q Okay. Well, let's—let me ask' you that question 
again here. Mr. Huber's response to, "We need to see your 
registration, too, please", is "Bullshit. Now look, you're 
on my property, this is my building, I haven't done anything 
wrong, I want to be left alone, I'm—I get tired of this 
harassment because I come out of my bar, and you guys start 
harassing, and I don't want it". And what's your response? 
A "We need to see your driver's license and the 
registration". 
Q So, he hadn't given you the driver's license, yet? 
A What happened was, things are getting pretty— 
pretty intense. He did give us the driver's license right 
about this time. 
Q Okay. 
A And I simply asked for it again, after he .had 
already produced it. 
87 
Ii "i II 'H I 1 ii I lie n i | 11 * 11 i HI a' I,I he a:;: on mi, nij u i || , >ni 
* - 11 1 was LI e i L a i l i L11.11 111 e r c w a s g o I n g I o \ j e a f; j r 1111, 
Q 01 :,<: 15 1 arid Mr Hi iber says
 f "'The registration is 
:ri III!:: ,„, ill t s • ::: • i :i 1 1 i =! I: ::: i c ] : a i id ;; * :: i i, r e go I n g t o r \ i n j t 
through the radio, you can find out just as quick as 1 ..can..1""" 
i MI I, Hlhirif " ' , ] ''on ::i i: response? 
J ! ' I »cx : ] :::, M] : Huber , we're trying to bo decent here"1 • 
"Q And Mr. Huber says, "No, you're not.- Why did, 
I c "i i ]:::::: i :iJ II r m :: • : • • :: :i : i " 
I: "As we s a i d , you, were going t oo f a s t . 1 1 
And Mr. Hi i b e r ' s r e s p o n s e I s , "No, H » r- because what 
I, III: • a: aus€ ! ;;r : i: „, I: : IU a 1 ; > to lu , ani ill.ill " . 
. what's your response? 
' ' 'In j'i ist about two seconds ,. w e , re not cjo v * uu ue: 
f: (311 ::, :: i.;i 1 ! \ i"e i leed to ia.ie tl i.e registratioi I. f 
Q Mr Kuber says, "Fine, fi ne, fine. Get your llohts 
\ IS^A T believe this was when Officer Guyer arrived 
• * *-•• , • and Gays, speaking to 1 iim, "We. 1]! be with \ ou 
\\ TIr. Huber says , , f T h I s i s a, • >n. : h ~ f 
: :. • * ^
!
 v •. * * l i e c a r - -1 t - - ,1 t' s i n i i I e , i t ! s a, I w a y s 
i i 1 , i , ,:I i: :i,g ] I :jl i, t s <::: \ 11 o f n i, y c ar , g o d d am i I:, j 
guys piss me i: ight off". 
P Ky r e s p o n s e w a s , " H e r e ' s t h e d e a l , Mr. Hubn- v~ ,% 
a r e under a r r e s t for disorder] %" condur-* • * '-- n o i n o 
] a IL 1 , I i t ;; :: i 1:1 ::: I: lai id 3 1: N *1 1:1 1 id j • 
yuui: hands b e h i n d y o u r b a c k . " 
Q Ar i« I til lei 1 we go t o P a g e 2 ; i s t h a t r i g h t ? 
!"" ""! ! • • .1! i, s i r . 
' •* :-^ a r ; . y c \ , - \ f t e r l o o k i n g a t t h a t 
\,ix'^ jv,i:-: K . * * , r>„; ,. • - s c e n e , 
\>- i^de the decision • arrest him 
' , .• . ;.„.-*- said he vr.n ^nd~r arrest. 
behind y - l-ack" , a no o Huber ; V:..tt is Mie u- 1, 
* 1 again informed. I . , , 
arrest." 
iiull ||i I'IM in - ,iy"i a t : H o l d y o ' U l 
horiiMu, l e t iii*" put my k e y s i n 111*17 p o c k e t " . 
1 1 )| a y , Ui!1 1 1 do t i h i l , " 
11 « "v 1 11 y 1 u o f f , c an i t u r n my 
c a r o f f ? " 
I'I I1,111 I I  r e p l i o d
 r " N o t noi *. " 
,i I Hi Mill 11 >i - x i 
8!) 
m y attorney right n",./,1 fhi 3 :i s stupider than hel] , You 
guys want to go for this, y ou sit there in my car for no 
,11 1 « 1 '' 
A Thatfs when Office: ~-»: -r made comment, and asked 
Mr. iiuber If t-.hp handcuff3 w^ ~-> *-- •-:-*,•. 
Q Okay. Whai «; 
put the handcuffs 0:1 him? 
A There was a couple minutes involved in that as 
well -
Q v/t a happened when . *.. a* - ae cu: * . 
A \ 
process, M* • a.- iacir:\. .: ^ahaex- ice: t<ope. .xdd 
•  * •* «d wiu other arm, ani h;i was struggling 
Q Okay. Let me ask you, .! LOW were yon situated when 
^u iirst ' iA ur* )*••> w:ts arrest and started to cuff him? 
I fere you facing h 1a veli 1 c I a ." 
I war; facing him. 
Q 01 ,iy. 
n
 I fas f a c i n g Mr. Huber . And we w e r e - • h i. •> < ' e h i c i e 
would "have b e a n , was parked to our r i g h t f ac ing north— 
Q I J1 1 1 11 ill (af f i r mat4" * . 
A - - i n t l le p a r k i n g s t i : i u f and I was j u s t o t i Lu the 
side of it
 r d t l 1 MJ : Hi il >e 1: 
Q Okay, 1 In; :1 ;; < a 1 t 
A V » i , " 1 1 J 
Q And d id you do t h a t ? "^  . *-; \aiC ; t 
hands t)fkhiiv1 you. 7ur n a round and .: 
, i l l in j J . i n I i 
A Yes. 
Q - What 1 ia;i ipe n e d th< :;;i i? 
A He didn't, \ I'e physical! y had to t~-- ' ' 
him sideways and try tn 3 'put hi s arms" behind 
sN: • :1 K 15 1 1 1 !"\ : I 1 : 3 \ : • "[ 1 /!::  i J!: ; } lai H 
Q Most people don't. 
A No. Most people 1< * '* 
Q • 1 .'- * . , i ^ , . , ; n : L 
time?' 
A . Yes si r • 
Q D:i • i 1 .e say ..,,'- J you were cutting hlri'i?' 
A Not—the only thing--vh^t I ll'i.ivf* here Is what 
there was
 r • -
Q IIh 111:11 1 ( • f f i r m a t i v e ) • 
A — a s f a r as ray c o n t a c t with'" hi ra was . 
Q Iik 11 II I I II1 1 " 1 • 1 1 1 1 1 l i d LAI n M i d i * i i I 1 t J n (1 II II i n , 1 I 1 111 
him s a y i n g a n y t h i n g w h i l e y o u ' r e c u f f i n n him? 
A Other than what yo1 1- -he sa i d " 'T 1 : .1 it one 1 s we*j *. 
5 f e 1: e 1 IC ' € t c o 1 1 e o f 11 1 e 1 i a nd c u I J: s . 
Q . Okay. But t h a t ' s a f t e r *• I in c u f f e d ? 
A IIh "In 111 |af f i i-nM- i"1 '•») 
c) 1 
r • -it. .T^CO* r.t - ^uj.le j^ ou were n 
- r u g g i e . . . 
HI ill II i i ih.111 eJ I. !i It* 14" I 
1 i1 11 iw i*1 i u s e 
: e y o u v : o r ^ r—i:\: * b 4 ? a ? 
"
 s
 Jii Li.e r i a n t -iiciiiu s i a e o4 % 
TS 
Q Okay. And : t tro>, * > -__„r_e minutes t o g e t 
I1JLIU ' ' 
Q :\ rr'r. rcu\t i **: continued that R o p e r ' s 
Q , HI I I '/i HI Like rae to l o o s e n Llieiii 
" •
i : k J t - ^ ^rvi fluber s a y , , "I I l i k e t o a. ". b.* 
wear-* ' *v " ^ i i u . ' r "f* u M " p 1 a * | ' i iu T '1M, I JIM H1 IM'I > 
a r ° T , , * ^ t * : r . 4 * " i^ * i r ^ y : ; i i •; »LkLi t» j L » f !tei*c? 
A Th^t wov. 1 d h i*ro br* ^ r: *"! •: r<r^ nn t Guv0 r . 
Q 
h i iii cut fed? 
A He was—he was pulling up as that was occurring. 
Q Okay. As you r e c a l l ? Okay. ' •• 
I In- i i i i 11 ijij a a t p o -
.* -.;,-• r i g h t ? 
A " Ye3, s i r , 
Q '.• A f t e r you g e t him c u f f e d , ai id lie has a b r i ef 
c o n v e r s a t i o n tfith O f f i c e r -Guyer, t h e n you s t i l l t ook 1 lira t o 
III« 
, A Yes
 f s i r . 
Q • How long were you w i t h him when you took% him t o 
j c , i J c L i i, 3 ] • : f 1 1 i :I III i i, t . Il I :t < i j - t. :I ] ? • 
A J u s t long enough t c H 1 1 p • \ iJ t he f \ i-1 m f o r the ' 
j a i l e r s . 
Q Ok< ij „ WI l i it i \ as 1 l i 3 comments , i f *nv - v I ::» you werfe 
a t t h e j a i l , t o you? 
A ' He seemed q u i — h e was v e r y q u i e t . 
Ill making any more comments. 
U Okay, lie calmed down? 
•' A II iii ,1. 
Q Okay, Time f rame, as b e s t as you can r e c a l l , 
frora when yn<i i n i t i a l l y c o n t a c t him t h e r e , as yon pu l l h 
Il i ( i II 1 Him II in in uli in in I I I hi i 11 .I II il I t > ( L u i a t i . D U N 1 1 I h a II v\ Him 
I * * 
finally qof liiin arrested and Officer (luyer's on the sin IIH 
talking with Mr, Muher at that "oint? 
A AppioximaLuly, total *™e was approximately i-ivu 
to six minutes. 
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A Tha' .; correct 
Q Ok ^.LI^L that, :._ jaimed down quite a bit.. 
A 1^  
Q We ''ore'.s ' - . \ * -^1 language aft* 
A iv. - -
Q Dut ! " -: J- ' • - tJ'\ '* *, 
A • N o i i:i r . 
Q He didn't get any worse, he didn't get any 
better; is H M ! * iqht*? 
A I I . . < I ' H H I I I | l i I I \ J ' J l ' l I ' l l H i l l 1 I I  II I l l n 1 I 
through,, 
Q Okuy. He just quit swearing when you turned the 
A 1 don't believe that he knew that I had a recorder, 
Q So *••'•*-* *• it why he' quit swearing? He just 
"happened fro o swearing; 
A I suppose. 
Q TI • : > 1 :! ' I: :i u ' < ; 1 1 I < 1 1 1 > « ; : s (.  IO r < i a f t e i: t h e - - a f t e r y o i) 
t u r n e d t h e r e c o r d e r on i s whei i I ir Roper s l i ined the 3 il ghl I .i 
h i s c a r ; i s 11 i at r i g h t ? 
A T i l . ! 1 " >. H I M i»i: l . 
Q And at that point, yon arrested him? 
A Shortly after that, y<*r., sir. 
Q So ,. I il lat last sw - - . -
% 
' ha whole t u ' ~ ~ T ' --1-. i t ? 
• 'Ciiu'ji! lie was n)bjec t i n g t o 
!-.->i * i ' h e cai . ^ ' you I ; a / *- 1
 t \ e tha t : e i t h e r , d i d yo\: 
n o * - TPV , , _ ! O n < * ^ , j . O ^
 t - • < w L » i a ! . , . cl 
persu * * noino vehi^l^. ^specially * v\ .. . *^M:e 
hands 
tt p : s , n • V,S.J entering the vehicle? 
. - * , 4-K,. . - . . » T i c i 
a j 
r e g i s t r a t i o n .. ^ ^Juhu 
A TTi - * t ' n c o r r e c t . 




— u a r r e s t e d him? 
, , i r . 
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 - i :!:i: ;; th i i ig } • ::>iii i ' :i c ,sk- = fil f :: r ; l: n it till i : m y 
} i H I lie: H I 
::: i i 
irri- * .:::r 'iyway? 
t o c o r r e c t . 
C 
! \ t .au3«i the situation, I d:I di ,' 1 see any other \ /ay 
Q Why? What else were you going to do at that point, 
that you were a fra I d tha*- h^ **^ fTr'in«" *-^  irterfere w i t h ? 
• A' .- Because il le i! iad e d to me 
d i s o r d e r l y conduct. •. • ; 
<U L ' i ne nad -aid time las' 
"Get your fm;„ .. . ,. • . -. .... ^ T^ ddai..: t."
 f you w<^ »l . 
have arrested h Ira. anyway? 
A \ 
dowi i, probab2 y — i t ' • • * • t * - - y? rJicw 
si Hi ib = i' :: k ai :d second g i it : .ss wfc a t we were going; to do . 
Q We] il , w h a t you • d o n 1 1 you . til I. i i ik t l lat : i t was maybe 
j u s t t l le shock of t h a t l a s t o b s c e n i t y , as i t were? 
A K 
Q Yo- ... i:ft think it was that? 
• ' A' " Tr:^ v?ar: the fi n—-that was the straw that broke 
o to 
Q lit • hut p o i n t , you became angry ; i s t h a t r i g h t ? 
A ' Ku "»: r . 
Q Did you f e e l l i k e t h e n e x t th in* . ...*• was g o i n g 
t o h a p p e n wi In1 was no 1 rip t o ' w l n n '>TI sora^hod^/? 
A I 1 IJ 1 t tliil I I ll «ll Wt'l I l|( l I I 111'J I I l 
t h a t . 
Q But 1 1 i i1 
A No , s i x . I I "I J fi n o t , 
Q And he got h i s d r i v e l ' s l i c e n s e o u t and h i s 
i iiri| in i ( 1 ,) i 11 (1 i mi in , Hill I li I 111 in il li i i HI ( j1 1 i i d 
A T h a t i s c o r r e c t . 
Q So , "iotmuilh1 .if I h<it p o i n t I s u p p o s e , t ro ra w h a t 
yon ve hct tn, thru tLe s i t u a L lut i p i e t i ^ WtU u i i l i i h i u i 
A No . s i r . II Utin n o t . 
Q W i l l i i l l i i l l in I Ill nil II l i III I i i l l l i III i I l i II 
d r i v e l ' s l i c e n s e , r e g i s t r a t i o n , HI t e h im a t i c k e t t o r 
s p e e d ! n g f and l e a v e ? 
A B e c a u s e t IMI i. no I I hi1 lino, III liiippetKiiL 
Q We ifihMiii i l h i s I s w r o n g , t h i s r e c o r d i n g ? 
• •. A • Nc >, s i :i :. 
: Q Wl lei i d i d he hand you. t h e r e g i s t r a t i o n ? 
• A If ' h e handed I t t o me , :I t wou ld h a v e b e e n — i t 
• "'i: i: < i d r i girl it aft >J :, ' " 1 1 ; i s ill s a 1 , " I1. 
-hat the car's mine". 
Q Okay. 
0 when he handed you the 
regi&trati-oni 
•• A ' - Yes, sir* 
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Q So, you had the r eg i s t r a t i on , you had the d r i v e r ' s 
l icense? 
A Yes, s i r , 
Q And then you arrested him? 
A Yes, sir. 
Q So that was, I take it, a foregone conclusion at 
that point, you were going to arrest him anyway? 
A At that point, yes, sir. 
Q Okay. Whatever he came up with? 
A That's correct. 
Q So, that was really before he said anything, any 
swear words for quite awhile, for at least a page of 
testimony here, he hadn't sworn once during that time. You— 
so, you'd made the decision prior to—before you even 
engaged him with the tape recorder; is that right? 
A No, sir. That's not correct. 
Q Go, it wasn't the swearing, that's not the reason 
that you arrested hira; is that what you're 3aying? 
A -No, sir. That's not what I'm saying. 
Q You did arrest hira for the swearing? 
A That was part of it. 
Q Okay. Decause you felt that anybody that said 
fuck in Logan City was guilty of disorderly conduct; is 
that correct? 
MR. BRADY: Your Honor, I'm going to object. Itfs 
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is saying, though, Kr. Brady, that the term itself is not 
obscene, in the Supreme Court's opinion* 
KR. BRADY; The term? 
THE COURT: Yes. 
MR. BRADY: Well, I won't object with that 
argument. I can read Gooding and I think the Court can 
read Gooding, and the Goodsel case, the California Cohen 
case, and they have said, the terminology in Cohen vs. 
California case, it was an individual walking down a hallway 
with a leather jacket that said, "fuck the draftM, and the 
court said that's not a fighting word because it wasn't 
uttered in a fighting word type situation. 
MR. LAURITZEK: No, it said it wasn't an obscene 
word. 
MR. BRADY: That word is a protected word. But 
then they start talking about fighting words, and— 
THE COURT? Well, what I intend to do, gentlemen, 
is in the Instruction Ho. 2, I'm going to read it—leave it 
so-it, after the word engaging in abusive, I'm going to 
leave the word "abusive" in and then I'm going to strike 
"or obscene language", take that out, or make obscene 
gestures. I don't see any obscene gestures in the evidence 
that's been presented that should come there, so that that 
instruction will read "engage in abusive manner in a public 
place", period. 
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THE CLERK: Just wipe that out, Judge? 
THE COURT: Pardon? 
THE CLERK: We just wipe that out? 
THE COURT: Yes. I think we can just wipe that 
out, so what I'm going to do, I'm just going to mark the 
part here while I'm—just wipe thai: ouc, and then in tha 
Instruction Ho. 3, I'm going to leave Paragraph 1 as its 
written, Paragraph 2 at the top, A, leave that in, 3, I'm 
going to leave that, in, engaged in abusive, and then from 
that point, I'm going to take out the words "or obscene 
language or obscene gestures", I'm going to have that 
stricken in that instruction at that point in time. 
MR. BRADY: Your Honor, I would object on the 
record,- simply—I don't have any problem with the Court 
saying they're going to strike obscene gestures in a public 
place. I firmly believe that it's obscene language, though, 
and I don't—I wish the Court had time to read these cases, 
because it's my interpretation of the cases that counsel is 
reading that you look at the totality of the circumstances 
to justify whether they're obscene or not, on their face. 
.and I think we're taking that criteria away from the jury 
by not using the tern, or leaving the tern obscene language 
in there, in both 2 and 3. I have no problem with obscene 
gestures, I— 
THE COURT: All right. I'll back up, I'll go that 
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far with you, Mr, Brady, I'll give you that chance# so leave 
the word obscene language in and then strike the word, "or 
make an obscene gesture", strike that. 
THE CLERK: Okay. 
MR. LAURITZEN: Let me point out to the Court that 
in State vs. John W.— 
THE COURT: Is that a Utah case? 
MR. LAURITZEN: No, it's a Maine case. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. LAURITZEN: It is construing some of these 
others. The juvenile said, hey you fucking pig, hey you 
fucking pig, fuck you, and they arrested him. And the 
court said, indeed, the words used by the juvenile are 
coarse and vulgar, but have become so commonplace devoid 
of any pruiejrt content. 
MR. BRADY: Sounds like--
MR. LAURITZEN: And that's exactly what Cohen said 
THE COURT: But I think Mr. Brady's point is that 
he was using the language, in addition to these other 
gestures and other circumstances that were going on. So— 
MR. LAURITZEN: As was the juvenile in John W. 
MR. ERADY: John W., your Honor, the juvenile was 
making those comments, directing those to the officers who 
were arresting his sister for similar language, who pled 
guilty or was found guilty. It was not in a face-to-face 
THE COURT: Wellf I'm going to deny the motion and 
restrict the instructions as indicated. 
MR. LAURITZEN: I'd except to the giving of that 
instruction in its whole. 
THE COURT: Okay. V7e'll note your exception. 
MR. LAURITZEN: Instruction No. 2. 
THE COURT: We111 note your exception. 
So, I guess we're back on— 
MR. LAURITZEN: Well, I don't have 2, anyway, in 
point of fact. I don't have Instruction No. 2 in its—the 
form that the Court ordered it to be typed in. I've got it 
that the defendant did intend to cause public inconvenience, 
annoyance or alarm, or reckless risk thereof, by engaging in 
fighting, or violent, tumultuous or threatening behavior, 
let's see. Yeah, abusive or obscene language or make 
obscene gestures in a public place, okay. I've got the— 
THE COURT: Yeah. 
MR, LAURITZEN: I still object to it. 
THE COURT: Right. Your objection will be noted, 
and I understand you'll take exceptions, and I guess now is 
not the time to do that on the instructions, so I guess at 
this point in time, fir. Lauritzen, the burden nov/ shifts to 
you to move forward. 
MR. LAURITZEN: Okay. Now, I would make another 
motion to dismiss the speeding case. 
THE COURT: Would you have the officer come back in 
please, with the jury? 
MR. LAURITZEN; We have to settle the instructions. 
You said— 
THE COURT: 0hf all right. Is there anything on 
instructions we need to settle outside the presence of the 
jury? 
MR. BRADY: We correct 2 and 3? 
THE COURT: We've corrected 2 and 3. 
MR. BRADY: It's my understanding that 2—you have 
stricken 2 and 3, both# you simply struck the comments on 
make obscene gestures. 
MR. LAURITZEN: I—okay. Are we on the record? 
THE COURT: Yes. 
MR. LAURITZEN: Okay. I've already made my 
objection to 2. 
THE COURT: Right. 
MR. LAURITZEN: All right. So, I will do so again 
since we are settling instructions. Comes now the defendant 
and objects specifically to giving of Instruction No. 2. 
Number one, because at this point in time, even what's on 
No. 2 does not constitute a public offense, but more 
importantly, it talks about obscene language, which there 
is no evidence before the Court on obscene language at 
this point in time. Abusive is not relevant because the 
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jury cannot consider an over-broad term such as abusive. 
Further, there13 no evidence that it's in a public 
place, as the Court sees on there, it was oji Mr. Huber's 
private property, and there's been no other evidence that 
it was in a public place. 
For that reason, I object to giving Instruction No. 
2 and those are the specifics I object to on. 
THE COURT: Okay. For the record, the exception 
is noted^and your motion is denied. 
MR. LAURITZEN: Okay. I object to the giving of 
Instruction No. 3 because it not only contains elements which 
are not in evidence, but elements which are not pleaded. 
The defendant knowingly created a hazardous or physically 
offensive condition. Now, I take it to be that that is a 
standard which is hazardous, or physically, that hefs 
put up some kind of an obstruction, created some kind of a 
machine which is croincr to damage or hurt someone, or has at 
least the ability to do so. He did not do that. That does 
not refer to any offer to fight or gesture to fight, that 
refers to a physical situation such as icing a road, greasinc 
stairs, something like that, that is what that is, itfs a 
digging a trench and concealing it like a deadfall, somethinc 
like that. That is a physically hazardous condition. 
A physically offensive condition is something like 
a gross smell, hauling dead animals over and throwing them or 
I U 
